This
book offers new insights and
understanding for both managers and
academics into people’s preferred
thinking styles and how they affect ways
of doing things, their outcomes and
other people, in both organisations and
elsewhere.
In most organisations individuals
are still mostly considered as
technically knowledgeable process boxes
where given the right inputs, training
and environmental conditions the
required outputs are expected to appear,
working well, smoothly and on time.
There is still little
consideration of the match between the
different ways in which all people
think, problem solve and create and the
demands and constrains of efficient
management, the organisational
environment and the others with whom
they work.
These different ways of problem
solving encompass a range between
bringing about change by working with
and within the prevailing paradigm and
by first altering this structure in
order to bring about desired change.
Thinking
style is explored, amply supported by
research, and located in problem solving
as a whole.
Then problem solving is set in
the wider, entirely practical, context
of the management of diversity
(including the diversity of styles) and
of change.
In this wider setting, problem
solving leadership depends less on the
technical expertise of a select few and
more upon the selection of appropriate
groups that can collectively solve
critical, complex problems, in
challenging environments aided by
problem solving leaders.
To meet the demands made of
managers in today’s climate, these
leaders require not only the technical
expertise to hold the respect of their
teams but also knowledge of the problem
solving process and of problem solvers.
This notion is currently getting
better considered, as when Khurarna
(2002) warns against over-reliance on
the charismatic superstar: “When a
company is struggling [its directors]
will not be satisfied with an executive
who is merely talented and experienced.
Companies now want leaders.”
A
GUIDING OUTLINE
The
Adaption-Innovation Theory relates to
thinking style – usually referred to
in the literature as cognitive style.
This theory explores and
describes human preferred individual
differences in the way they solve
problems; its related psychometric
inventory locates individuals on a
continuum ranging from high adaption to
high innovation.
Thinking
is the means by which we solve problems
and are creative (whatever the
distinctions between these two terms may
be).
Everything that lives has to
manage the changing world about it and
acquire those things that it needs to
survive.
If enough individuals of a
species survive long enough to reproduce
successfully that species continues to
survive.
This is not easy, the species
that exist today are reckoned to be but
one percent of all that have ever lived;
we are among the few survivors.
Mankind, one of the latest
arrivals, must also manage change and
diversity or perish.
In one form or another, whether
understood by the individual or not,
problem solving is the key to life.
Every species does so
differently.
This
book examines thinking style in the
context of problem solving, the key to
survival, of which it is an element.
In doing so, other elements of
problem solving: level (capacity),
motive and perceived opportunity, are
dealt with in depth and others, more
lightly, such as learning, attitude,
belief and group dynamics.
Style, within problem solving, is
then set into the wider context of the
management of change and diversity.
The examples that illustrate the
relationships of these elements are
drawn mainly from biology, psychology,
sociology, politics, management,
military history, science and the arts.
This range shows how the brain,
unaltered for a hundred millennia,
solves a vast diversity of problems in
much the same general way.
However, every individual is also
unique, as each brain operates with
small but vital, characteristic
variations.
This diversity of problem solver
is at once an advantage and an added
problem: how to combine to solve those
problems that cannot be done alone yet
how to manage people not like us.
This and a number of other themes
thread though this book.
The paradox of structure, from
personal experience to social paradigm,
is another; without it we cannot think,
but, while enabling, it is also
limiting.
We each solve this paradox, as
every other problem, differently.
The
breadth of the setting underlines how
such seemingly small differences in
thinking between people (Mankind
contains no sub-species) have been
exploited so successfully.
In fact, so successfully has this
brain worked that the majority of the
trickiest problems it now faces are as a
result of its success and our growing
expectation of further success.
The standards required of
today’s problem solvers would surely
have left medieval monarchs amazed –
the nature of progress is truly
catalytic, feeding with increasing
rapidity on its own success.
Not perhaps surprisingly, the
theme of the next chapter is that
problem solving is the key to all life.
The more we understand problem
solving and the problem solver the
better off we might be; such added
knowledge can be put to good advantage
particularly in problem solving
leadership.
The
foundations must first be understood. All forms of life, Mankind included,
have evolved a structure that fits all
their survival needs, e.g., finding and
absorbing appropriate nutrient.
This structure is also limiting,
e.g., the eyes that are good in daylight
are poor in half-light.
Mankind has become expert in
overcoming many limitations, but the
underlying structure remains the same.
The astronaut may get to the moon
but still walks to the space vehicle; the
image that is enhanced by the telescope
passes through the eye developed many
millions of years ago to a brain that
has remained unaltered for 100,000
years.
So problem solving needs to
exploit but not ignore these limits;
Mankind has developed the greatest
facility of working round natural limits
that the world has yet experienced.
The world’s more advanced life forms
have developed instincts.
Instincts are so complex (like
building a nest) they transcend the more
primitive built-in biomechanical
responses and yet are so rigid that each
one is immediately recognisable by
experts as belonging to a particular
species.
Each represents a whole problem
solving process: problem identification,
solution selection and implementation.
The survival value of instincts
is immense, for they can all be done
without learning; indeed without ever
having been seen done by another.
Yet they operate almost perfectly
on the first occasion they are used even
if learning can be added on to them to
enhance the base response they provide.
Their weakness is that they are
hard wired: once triggered every
individual must operate in the same way
and changes to instincts can only come
about by breeding not by thinking.
Using this precise biological
definition, Mankind is unique – having
no instincts.
When we perceive a danger ahead
while driving we do not ‘break by
instinct’.
We have learned to do so –
perhaps so well that it is now a
conditioned reflex but all complex
problem solving response is learned,
nevertheless.
For Mankind, what we need to know
we must be taught.
Learned problem solving, well developed
in all higher order species, offers the
widest potential range of responses and
the greatest problem solving
flexibility.
The advantages of problem solving
are obvious for Mankind’s achievements
are huge compared to any other organism
(indeed, most of the problems we
currently face are of our own making)
but the expense is high.
Everything we do, except for
those in-built structures, has to be
learned: who are our enemies, what to
eat, how to get it, how to mate, how to
give birth or how to nurture our young.
As learning takes time and
practice, our young are more vulnerable,
for longer, than those of any other
species.
In order to survive we need
continually to learn.
A-I Theory emphasises two key
issues: (a) When we problem solve we are
limited by the way we are built (e.g.,
our intelligence, no-one has endless
capacity or flexibility) but we have no
instinct to help or hinder us.
(b) All of us are intelligent and
creative, at different levels and with
different styles, and, therefore all of
us are capable of problem solving, as
long as there is both motive and
opportunity.
In this book cognitive style will be
defined and described within the problem
solving process; then this process will
be set in the wider context of the
management of change and diversity.
The aim is to add to the
understanding of the human problem
solving process in a wide variety of
situations over long periods of time.
The breadth of the setting
underlines how these seemingly small
differences in thinking between people
(Mankind contains no sub-species) have
been exploited so successfully.
In fact, so successfully has this
brain worked that the majority of the
trickiest problems it now faces are as a
result of its success and our growing
expectation of further success.
The standards required of
today’s problem solvers would surely
have left medieval monarchs amazed –
the nature of progress is truly
catalytic, feeding with increasing
rapidity on its own success.
Not perhaps surprisingly, the
theme of the next chapter is that
problem solving is the key to all life.
The more we understand problem
solving the better off we might be.
We are indebted to the ancient Greeks
for usefully dividing knowledge into
that of physics and metaphysics, thereby
allowing us to study and reveal
understanding of nature’s laws in each
area with better precision.
From physics and later chemistry
comes the discipline of biology from
which, in turn, emerges the discipline
that studies behaviour – that of
psychology.
From the study of the outcome of
the minds of humans emerge all the other
disciplines currently on offer.
Adaption-Innovation theory,
therefore, relates to many very
different topics, each closely
interlinked with the others, stretching
from biology across psychology into
sociology and on into every area of
human problem solving – from
anthropology and the progress of
science, business and government,
warfare and conflict to the writing of
music and the teaching of art.
It appears that brain function
does not make much distinction between
the many kinds of problem it has to
solve or the disciplines from which they
emerge.
The distinctions may only be how
familiar with the problem, the amount of
effort needed to master it and the
degree of satisfaction derived from its
resolution.
In understanding problem solvers
it is useful, then, to view the
applicability of any hypothesis, finding
or derived theoretical notion, over a
wide range of human activity.
If they illuminate widely over
incident, time and culture they are
likely to be revealing of problem
solvers generally.
It
is an added complication that there are
many other theories and fields of study
that relate to problem solving,
including popular but untested beliefs,
practices and plain muddles,
particularly those involving such trendy
terms as ‘creativity and innovation’
or ‘instinct’.
Terms like these, that are
notoriously hard to define and harder to
measure reliably, either need to be
better defined or avoided.
Instinct, for example, is defined
so that it is not mistaken either for
the way the structure of the
brain works or for learning.
This is rather like the
distinction between the hard wiring of
the computer (what it is designed to
do), the software (built-in problem
solving programs) and the operator’s
own programs.
The value of these distinctions
is that we can understand better the
limits of the brain’s function and
learn better to allow for them whilst
learning to work round them.
Creativity, to take a second
example, is treated as a sub-set of
problem solving: useful in general
discussion but not much use, at present
at any rate, in measurement.
Only one term is needed (the
brain does not appear to distinguish
them) for serious matters, such as
management, counselling or research.
We can, for these purposes, just
rely on the term problem solving; this
should help get clearer hypotheses to
test and, possibly, clearer answers to
our questions.
THE
CORE OF THE THEORY
Understanding Adaption-Innovation
The
Adaption-Innovation theory is founded on
the assumption that all people solve
problems and are creative.
This theory is concerned only
with style; with how people solve
problems.
Both potential capacity
(intelligence or talent) and learned
levels (such as management competence)
are completely independent
characteristics and assessed by other
measures.
This means that innovators and
adaptors can each be found at every kind
of these levels – from the highest to
the lowest.
Therefore, the terms ‘more
adaptive’ or ‘more innovative’ are
more precise than ‘adaptors’ and
‘innovators’, for the theory
describes a normally distributed
continuous range and not just two types.
The more adaptive prefer their
problems to be associated with more
structure, and with more of this
structure consensually agreed, than
those who are more innovative.
The more innovative are more
tolerant, at least while in the pursuit
of a solution, to looser guiding
structure.
However, all brains need such
structure or they cannot operate.
Indeed, at the very core of the
brain’s success is the amount of
structure it can accumulate and use well
in solving the problems it perceives as
needing to be solved.
Just one example of structure is
language – and no other organism could
have written this text or is able to
read it.
Many other structures are required,
e.g., the preferred style with which we
solve problems, the content of our
memory, our array of skills.
Other vital guidelines that are
built up by learning are our attitudes
and beliefs that allow us to access
information in understood patterns.
One of the key notions of the
book is the paradox of structure: that
it is, at one and the same time, both
enabling and limiting.
We endeavour constantly to
exploit structure and manipulate its
limits.
Adaptors and innovators do so
differently.
One way of summing up these
differences is to say that the more
adaptive
prefer to solve problems by the
use of rules and the more innovative
despite the rules.
Here, ‘rules’ are used to
represent all cognitive structures;
examples of other terms are: theories,
policies, precedents, terms of reference
and paradigms.
The argument also advanced,
supported by research, is that these
differences in preferred style are
stable but that we nudge the limits they
impose by coping behaviour.
Another key element in the theory is
that only individuals think.
Brains cannot be linked together
like computers.
Whenever I ask you for help, and
you agree, we are each instantly faced
with two problems.
Problem A is the reason we have
formed the group – the reason for the
formation of any group of living
creatures – mutual self-help.
But we have also acquired Problem
B, how to manage each other – all
without aid from instinct, as is
explored fully in a following chapter.
The main thought that emerges is
that unsuccessful problem solving teams
spend more energy on Problem B than A.
Yet we need each other; there are
too many limits to an individual working
alone to solve most problems that demand
solution.
Another thought explored is that
such diversity of problems requires for
their resolution a diversity of
resources, including a diversity
of problem solvers (and we are back to
Problem B).
Adaption-innovation is just such
a diversity of resource.
The more diversity of resources
at a team's disposal, the greater is its
potential to resolve an array of
problems.
But stockpiling diversity is an
added burden, for diverse teams are more
difficult to manage.
In the case of style, this is
because each individual’s preference
can also be seen to have disadvantages
and to be a potential source of cost,
friction and distraction.
Each individual is a unique
diversity (or, strictly, a complex of
diversities) and, within a group, has to
face this problem two ways: how to
present this diversity as more useful
than expensive and, for the same reason,
to be tolerant of another's similar
presentation.
The whole range of diversity
needs to be managed well for the common
good.
If not, then although such
management of change may be efficient,
it will be narrow. It will be argued
that the adherents of competing narrow
views are liable to produce a pendulum
of vacillation instead of a progression
of change.
Such narrow ranging views are
likely to create resistors to change.
Defining
Cognitive Style
The
first time anyone becomes aware of
cognitive style is when a predictable
difference is noticed between the ways
(manner, style) that any two people
appear to go about solving similar
problems.
A person behaving persistently
differently from oneself may be just an
intriguing fact, or turn out to be
useful or even irritating.
These are marked tendencies,
within a single continuum, that are so
stable that they are liable to persist
even in circumstances in which it
appears, at least to others, to be a
disadvantage.
A curiosity is that most such
disadvantages that emerge are noticeable
less in oneself than in others.
This difference is in the individual’s
preferred direction of focus, whether
within or across boundaries.
Adaptors more readily anticipate
threats from within the system (often
devising, in good time, plans to
economise, downsize, etc.), whereas
innovators are more ready to anticipate
events that might threaten from outside
it, such as, the earlier signs of
changing taste and markets or
significant advances in technology not
yet fully exploited.
In research, it was noted that
every manager tended not only to miss
some cues that were picked up by others
but also found their warnings irritating
and distracting ‘to the real issues’
(i.e., the ones they could see
clearly).
Often the cues missed or noted
fell into a pattern, some managers
missing cues emanating from within the
system and others missed those from
outside.
This suggested the influence of
style differences rather than of skill.
However,
there is a marked tendency for people to
attribute differences in style (indeed,
any differences between them and others)
as level differences.
The principal reason may be that
such judgements rarely take enough of
the relevant data into account.
It is not clear to any observer
making the judgements whether the
characteristic is inbuilt or learnt,
whether it can be readily varied to
accord with circumstance, whether we are
all liable to the same kind of tendency
(erring by no lesser degree but in
different ways, on different occasions)
or whether there is an unsuspected
advantage to the group for having within
it people who have such different
attributes.
These are rarely serious topics
of conversation for the managers; yet
this knowledge is at the core of
leadership.
Despite the fact that such
differences are often erroneously seen
as a deficiency of level (ability or
capacity) the early work in
Adaption-Innovation stated simply that
managers' capacities do not account for
these differences in approaching
problems; they seem to be differences of
style.
It seems a simple issue, but it
has become more and more obvious that
this sharp distinction between style and
capacity is not wholly understood, much
less wholly accepted.
The confusion between level and
style seems to contribute significantly
to difficulties that have above been
dubbed as Problem B, so this confusion
is well worth untangling.
The confusion spreads when such
terms as ‘creativity and innovation’
or ‘change agent’ are used to imply
that innovation alone will solve all
problems and only a few of us can bring
about change.
Such terms are divisive, creating
‘resistors to change’ among those
who think more clearly or among those
who are made to feel excluded.
Description
of Adaption-Innovation
So
far, this description has been in wide
terms and in the context of general
problem solving – the way the problem
solver relates and manages cognitive
structure; in fact, though, any
structure perceived by the brain has to
be converted into cognitive structure if
it is to be used to problem solve. The
A-I characteristic is one such
structure, which with other influences
on behaviour, like attitudes, plus those
behaviours make up the domain of
personality.
A chapter is devoted to this link
listing, in theory supported by
research, the many different traits
relating to cognitive style, such as:
risk-taking, dogmatism, tolerance of
ambiguity, extraversion, conservatism,
flexibility, etc., but excluding such
traits as anxiety, neuroticism, or any
other element of cognitive affect. This
inter-relationship with so large an
array suggests a continuum at the level
of a dimension of personality.
To assist the reader to get an overview
of these terms in the context of brain
function, a schema has been devised.
As with all schemata, this is a
simplification of a complex reality,
which one hopes, nevertheless, may give
a useful overview of the brain’s
inter-related functions.
Within this embracing structure,
the key elements of the brain’s
function have been entered as if they
were departments of a business
enterprise, devoted to its own survival.
Style appears in the
‘planning’ department, taking
instruction from the boardroom – the
department of cognitive affect that
decides what problem is to be tackled
and what kind of solution will satisfy.
A third, ‘backroom’,
department of cognitive resource
processes (through learning) and then
stores all experience on which the other
two rely for past reliable information.
These elements of cognitive
function are stable, characteristic
influences on behaviour, which together
with stable characteristics of behaviour
make up an individual’s personality.
THE
WIDER IMPLICATIONS
Finally,
it can be salutary to reflect that all
the problems of human survival have been
solved only by that one unaltered brain.
Like modern boardrooms and
governments, whole populations, in the
Fertile Crescent, the West, China,
America and Australia, have had periods
of technological advance, stagnation and
even retreat – variations that often
have been attributed to high or low
capacity of various whole populations.
In the past, the fate of defeated
populations attracted little sympathy
among the victors.
In many quarters today, an
alternative extreme view is that the
winning groups of the past are tinged
with evil and the losers have never done
wrong.
However, these phenomena need to
be seen in cooler perspective else the
righting of perceived ancient wrongs may
cause yet more damage.
The indubitable backdrop fact is
that all organisms (alone or in groups)
succeed at the expense of others – all
change, however much it might be deemed
as good by the cognoscenti, destroys
something.
How can we ensure the values of
competition yet avoid the disasters of
aggression?
A brief anthropological review
suggests that basic opportunities for
social advancement (the natural local
occurrence of useful plants, animals or
materials) were available in very
different amounts in different
environments – with the Fertile
Crescent and China being heavily
favoured.
The argument advanced is that
opportunity, or lack of it, must be a
prime factor in differences of
advancement of whole populations.
This is also true within any
group or culture.
But there is another factor, some
changes that are on offer (or when first
on offer) may appear more as threats
than chances not to be missed.
As with individuals, so with
cultures (which are the reflections of
their members’ shared structures):
different environments offer varying
opportunities at differently perceived
cost, to be managed, then exploited.
People, alone or in groups, among
hunter-gatherers or in boardrooms, are
constantly faced with choices and we
need, in today’s increasingly complex
world and increasing individual
expectation (at ever lower human cost), better understanding by
more of us of the principles on how they
are made.
The winners among groups of people may
start off with only a small advantage
over others but change is catalytic in
its nature – one change leading to an
advantage is the base for another change
that leads to greater advantage.
Gradually, this spiral of change
becomes irresistible, giving
overwhelming power to those in the lead.
All organisms succeed at the
expense of others. The winners take over
space and resources for their own ends;
others, even sub-sets of their own kind
(unless protected by an instinct mankind
does not posses) can be killed, eaten,
enslaved, absorbed (lose identity) or
brushed aside into unfashionable
addresses.
Mankind has tried all this with
other organisms and within its own
barely defined sub-sets.
The process of collaborative
problem solving needs to be better
understood so that it can be more
insightfully applied.
We all need to understand better
how to manage diversity so that we can
manage change more effectively.
To manage diversity one must
first accept that it exists; every
individual is unique and so is a
minority of one.
Each person needs to consider the
balance of the costs against advantages
of uniqueness to a group's survival;
that every right an individual claims
needs to be offset by obligation, for
rights without obligations are accorded
only as charity not as a part of an
equal mutual exchange.
This are not just matters of
ethics but of mutual survival because:
a
diversity of problem solvers is required
to solve a diversity of problems;
style
is a diversity in the very core of each
individual’s
problem solving process;
managing
diversity is a key to achieving required
change efficiently.
GENERAL
SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS
-
Problem
solving is the key to life.
-
All
people problem solve (creativity is
a sub-set of problem solving).
-
Problem
solving creates change – every
individual is a ‘change agent’.
-
All
individuals evaluate each change
opportunity against personal cost
and advantage.
-
Adaption-Innovation
is the stable, preferred style
within which an individual solves
problems; it relates to the way
people manage (cognitive) structure.
-
Coping
behaviour permits departure from
preferred style, at a cost.
-
Style
is not correlated with any form of
level.
-
A
diversity of problem solvers,
deploying a diversity of resources,
is needed to solve life’s
diversity of problems, many of them
an outcome of mankind’s success.
-
Differences
in style are one of the many kinds
of diversities that problem solvers
need to manage well; all our
diversities and the ways they are
managed make up our personalities.
-
Individual
diversity is at the start point of
creating the specialist.
-
If
one cannot manage diversity well one
cannot manage change both widely and
well.
-
Managing
change narrowly and well is
efficient, until the problem range
being tackled widens, then past
success may make us slow to change
(accept the cost to widen).
-
How
much diversity is needed in a team
is dependent on the range of
problems it is solving.
Too little diversity leads to
failure; too much is costly to keep;
the problem is in defining the term
‘too’.
-
If
an in-group mismanages the
diversities within the wider group,
it may ‘create’ resistors to
(all of the in-group’s proposed)
change.
-
All
people are unique – therefore,
every person is in a minority of
one.
To collaborate individuals
need to offer their diversity as a
resource without destabilising the
group.
-
Every
time a person shares a problem with
another, each acquires two problems
– Problem A, the prime problem for
which they formed the team, and
Problem B, managing each other's
diversity.
-
Problem
A should take up more of the
collective energy than Problem B –
a prime task of leadership,
ensuring, e.g., that diversity training should not aim to
correct the past but to increase
future mutual benefit.
-
Styles
of leadership should be adopted as
roles selected to match the problem.
-
Paradox
of Structure: no cognitive structure
– no thought, no problem solving.
Too much structure and
problem solving becomes inelastic
and inefficient.
-
In
nature, failure is the norm.
Very few of all the species
that once lived still do – a
warning we do well to keep in mind.
Problems
have become so complex, and the penalty
for not solving many of them so high,
that every individual needs to study the
problem-solver as one more problem
needing to be solved.
Experts alone cannot be concerned
with this problem; their task is to help
others understand it also.
The problems of survival directly
concern us all.
©
M. J. Kirton 2002. No part of this
article may be reproduced without the
express permission of the author.